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Article
The dominant contemporary approach to studying congres-
sional leadership is contextualist—or contextual determinist. 
Stemming from rational choice, leaders are depicted in 
Mayhew’s words as “products of social, economic, or politi-
cal forces or as responding rationally to institutionally struc-
tured situations” (Mayhew, 2000, p. x). Following Cooper 
and Brady (1981) and Jones (1981; see also Aldrich & 
Rohde, 2000, 2001; Rohde & Shepsle, 1995; Sinclair, 1995), 
the most widely accepted formulations see the partisan con-
text in which leaders seek to provide leadership as determin-
ing their leadership behavior.
This contextual interpretation of congressional leader-
ship, however, contrasts with older studies by Alexander 
(1916/1970), Follett (1896), Fuller (1909), Chiu (1928/1968), 
which allow much greater room for leaders’ individual 
actions, skills, and style (see also Strahan, 2007). It is diffi-
cult to imagine a leader with a heterogeneous caucus and a 
bare chamber majority operating in the same fashion as one 
at the head of a more ideologically homogeneous caucus 
with a more comfortable chamber advantage. However, it is 
unlikely that context (or structure) alone can explain all con-
gressional politics and outcomes influenced by party 
leaders.1 Legislative chambers and legislative parties will be 
steered—by leaders whose personal qualities and abilities 
will vary (Keohane, 2005). Otherwise, why would caucus 
members choose one leader over another: Newt Gingrich 
(R-GA) over Bob Michel (R-IL); Bob Livingston (R-LA) 
over Gingrich just 4 years later; or, in 1875, the less well 
known and somewhat hesitant Michael Kerr (D-IN) over the 
more forceful and better known Samuel Randall (D-PA)? 
Equally, if the caucus (or the House) would determine legis-
lative outcomes with no significant leadership effects, then, 
why have caucus nominations and speakership elections 
often been so combative (Jenkins & Stewart, 2012; Lientz, 
1978)?
Accepting that congressional leaders are not mere ciphers 
of whatever their conference adds up to and therefore condi-
tioned by an individual’s personal qualities presents signifi-
cant measurement and empirical/analytical problems, 
particularly for comparative analysis (Aldrich & Shepsle, 
2000; Fiorina & Shepsle, 1989). Congressional scholars 
have very good measures of contextual factors that influence 
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leadership behavior, such as the homogeneity of preferences 
within party caucuses; however, systematic measurement of 
leadership style presents a much more challenging enter-
prise. Still, one need not accept defeat. “[L]eadership is not 
an idiosyncratic residual that defies systematic analysis” 
(Schickler, 2001, p. 15). How, then, can we measure leader-
ship style?
To answer this latest question, we focus on speakers of the 
U.S. House of Representatives from Frederick Muhlenberg 
(Federalist-PA) to Dennis Hastert (R-IL). Building on previ-
ous work, we seek to address the measurement problem by 
generating reliable measures of successive speakers’ leader-
ship styles by focusing specifically on their respective com-
mitments to chamber comity and their individual leadership 
assertiveness when performing leadership and presiding 
roles within the House.2 Congressional scholars have focused 
on both aspects of leadership and have often connected one 
aspect with the other to suggest that the most efficacious—
and possibly the most effective—style of House leadership is 
one that combines a high commitment to comity with asser-
tiveness.3 For our purposes, a given speaker’s commitment 
to comity involves actions or non-actions that have the effect 
of promoting chamber civility whereas assertiveness mea-
sures the strength and intensity of a speaker’s interventions 
to promote his or the majority party’s policy or procedural 
preferences in relation to legislation or majority control of 
the chamber (Cooper & Brady, 1981, pp. 411-425; Follett, 
1896; Schraufnagel, 2005; Uslaner, 1991, 1993).
Measuring House Speakers’ Styles: 
Commitment to Comity and 
Assertiveness
Previous research has examined longitudinal differences in 
successive speaker’s behavior but, typically, this work has 
used small samples over relatively short periods of time and 
arrayed cases along fairly basic typologies of leadership 
style, for example, “centralized/decentralized” leadership 
power, “assertive/cautious” leadership styles, and more or 
less active (Palazzolo, 1992; Patterson, 1963; Strahan, 
Gunning, & Vining, 2006; Swift, 1998; Truman, 1959). 
Other work has arrayed leaders according to ideological 
“extremism” and/or levels of partisanship (Clausen & 
Wilcox, 1987; Grofman, Koetzle, & McGann, 2002; 
McGann, Grofman, & Koetzle, 2002; Polser & Rhodes, 
1997; Sinclair, 1983). Nuanced measurement of other aspects 
of speakers’ behaviors, however, has received less attention.
Congressional scholars cannot replicate the laboratory 
conditions that social psychologists may create to monitor 
and record leadership behavior in a detailed manner. 
Although denied direct access to our principals and to labo-
ratory experiments, we can emulate some of the methods of 
social psychologists, which have generated data on leaders’ 
personal characteristics, “at a distance” (Feldman & Valenty, 
2001; Post, 2003; Winter, 2003, 2005). These techniques 
include using content analysis of leaders’ verbal comments 
or written texts, employing experts to rate leaders on person-
ality scales, and identifying behavioral patterns from politi-
cal biographies (Christie & Geis, 1970; Hermann, 1980; 
Post, 2003; Winter, 1992).
A priori, the Congressional Record and predecessor pub-
lications might offer an attractive database for content analy-
sis. However, these sources do not allow rigorous analysis 
for a project spanning 200 or so years. Apart from the simple 
fact that the Record’s predecessors do not provide verbatim 
records of debate that might, for example, allow for the anal-
ysis of word use over time, then as now the record of floor 
proceedings does not necessarily yield the kind of data we 
need, although they can be important sources for corroborat-
ing speakers’ actions or non-actions referred to in secondary 
accounts and analyses. Indeed, although previous studies of 
the House speaker have certainly quoted incidents recorded 
on the House floor, for good reasons, none relies exclusively 
on this source. Similarly, any analysis of roll call votes on the 
customary votes of thanks to speakers will not yield the kind 
of hoped for hard data necessary for systematic analysis. The 
same is true of data on caucus votes, party nominations for 
speaker, votes in speakership elections, procedural rulings by 
the speaker, and appeals against the chair.4 Notwithstanding 
the undoubtedly hard status of much of these data, doubts 
will always remain, moreover, as to whether they effectively 
capture speaker assertiveness and/or commitment to cham-
ber comity.
Our alternative approach is to rely on careful analysis of 
the accounts of historians, journalists, and other observers of 
our 50 speakers. We justify this method on two grounds: 
First, quantitative data alone are likely insufficient to capture 
all that we hope to learn about a speaker’s commitment to 
comity and their assertiveness in office. Indeed, rarely have 
others relied exclusively on quantitative data in either con-
temporary analyses of recent House speakers or historian’s 
analyses of past occupants of the office (Peters, 1997; Peters 
& Rosenthal, 2008; Strahan, 2002, 2007; Strahan & 
Palazzolo, 2004). Second, while recognizing that a number 
of historical analyses provide post hoc evaluations of speak-
ers, sometimes attributing only negative characteristics to 
those subsequently seen as failures and positive features to 
successful speakers, such biases can be offset by using a 
wider range of sources for each speaker and exercising care-
ful judgment in avoiding biased accounts.
We initiate the measurement of successive speakers’ com-
mitment to chamber comity and their personal assertiveness 
while leading and chairing the chamber by trawling the many 
biographies and biographic profiles written by historians, 
journalists, and others who interacted with these leaders on a 
regular basis.5 Ultimately, we compiled a single 340-page 
bibliographic file into which were entered relevant quota-
tions and passages of text taken from the numerous sources, 
including history monographs, doctoral dissertations, 
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biographies of individual speakers, proceedings of the House 
from the Congressional Record and its predecessor publica-
tions, along with articles in learned journals, newspapers, 
and magazines. Relevant passages were also entered from 
key historical analyses of House speakers (Alexander, 
1916/1970; Brown, 1922; Chiu, 1928/1968; Follett, 1896; 
Fuller, 1909; Kennon, 1985; Peters, 1997). Only quotations 
that focused on a speaker’s relevant behavior while occupy-
ing the speaker’s chair were included in the file. Not surpris-
ingly, the volume and quality of material on individual 
speakers varied, but in no case were there less than 15 rele-
vant quotations available for any one speaker.6
Having compiled the biographical file, we subject the 
passages on each speaker to content analysis and code each 
leader according to his commitment to comity and leadership 
assertiveness. Informed by the extant congressional and 
social psychology literature, we disaggregated each speak-
er’s commitment to comity into four elements: generosity 
versus meanness of spirit toward other House members; pub-
lic courtesy versus discourtesy toward other members; agree-
ableness (including a commitment to reciprocity) versus 
disagreeableness; and fairness versus unfairness in presiding 
over the House and in dealing with other members (espe-
cially the minority party).7 In contrast, we define and mea-
sure leadership assertiveness along a single scale from strong 
to weak.
Once the contents of the bibliographic file were estab-
lished, the two lead authors independently read each passage 
in the file and coded each speakers’ leadership behavior 
along the five different 7-point Likert-type scales (1-7); four 
reflecting the multidimensionality of comity and the fifth 
tapping assertiveness. Particular care was taken to evaluate a 
speakers’ behavior from the chair rather than how such 
behavior was received on the chamber floor, which might or 
might not be the result of the chair’s action. By this method, 
comity and assertiveness scores were created by each author 
for 50 speakers.
Necessarily, evaluating and coding congressional leaders 
over more than 200 years of history risk applying contempo-
rary behavioral and moral judgments to individuals living in 
different eras. Thus, it might be argued that late 18th- 
century scholars, for instance, might score our subjects dif-
ferently. However, personality researchers and political psy-
chologists have for a number of years used this general 
technique across different historical contexts and with 
acceptable results (McCrae, 1996; Rubenzer, Faschingbauer, 
& Ones, 2002). A more serious concern with this type of 
research, however, must be inter-coder reliability (Caruso, 
2000). Researching well-known—and not so well-known—
congressional politicians introduces the risk of bias, reputa-
tional or political. Certain speakers, such as Joseph Cannon 
(R-IL) and Newt Gingrich (R-GA), have acquired contro-
versial reputations, whereas others, such as Henry Clay 
(Whig-KY) and Robert Winthrop (Whig-MA), are widely 
viewed more benignly.8
Table 1 shows bivariate correlations between the two 
authors’ first-cut coding of speaker style on the five different 
scales. In essence, our first coding attempts produce reason-
able levels of agreement, the lowest correlation being for the 
assertiveness scale, but even here, there was a statistically 
significant association. Reliability analysis (or principal 
components analysis) on the 10 items (five from each author) 
extracted two components: the first from the eight responses 
of the two authors on the first four questions measuring 
speaker’s commitment to comity, and the second from the 
author’s item-response on the fifth scale tapping assertive-
ness. The eight items loading on the first component explain 
60.98% of the inter-item variance, with no single item load-
ing less than .733. Reliability estimates for all 10 items, 
based on the first-cut coding, yield a Cronbach’s alpha coef-
ficient of .92.
Satisfied by the reasonable levels of correlation and the 
results of the factor and reliability analysis, the authors then 
engage in a collaborative effort to obtain the “best” score for 
each speaker on each of the five scales. This “second-cut” 
effort entailed lengthy discussions on all 500 values assigned 
(i.e., 2 × 5 scales × 50 speakers) with particular attention paid 
to discrepancies where scores placed individual speakers on 
different sides of the scale median.9 In these extensive dis-
cussions, the authors resolved also to reduce the difference 
between their coding of each speaker on any scale to a maxi-
mum of two points. As a result of this collaborative effort, 
31.8% of the 500 values were changed, but 63.7% of these 
changes were by a single digit. The second-cut coding pro-
duced bivariate correlations that exceeded r = .85 (p < .001) 
for each of the five scales.10 Once the authors had completed 
their collaborative coding efforts, the average of their scores 
on each of the five scales was then deemed the “best” value 
for each speaker.
To verify further the reliability of the authors’ best values, 
three graduate students were hired to read the same 340-page 
bibliographic file and code the speakers separately along the 
same five scales. The three students came from two different 
academic institutions separated by considerable geography. 
To ensure each student coder thought carefully about the spa-
tial placement of individual speakers along the different 
scales, and to avoid response set bias, the directions of one of 
Table 1. Bivariate Correlations for Authors’ First-Cut Coding.





Summative comity score (first four items) .84**
Assertive—Unassertive .47**
n = 50
**p < .01. (two-tailed).
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the comity scales as well as the assertiveness scale were 
deliberately reversed. Table 2 shows that the correlations 
between each student’s score and the authors’ best score for 
each scale were statistically significant. Combined with the 
strong first- and second-cut coding correlations, these addi-
tional significant correlations provide us with considerable 
confidence in the reliability of the authors’ scores, which we 
use in the subsequent statistical analyses.
The possible values for a speaker’s commitment to comity 
range from a low of 4 to a high of 28, and for assertiveness 
from a low of 1 to a high of 7. With the comity scores, lower 
numbers originally indicated a greater commitment to 
comity. These values were subtracted from 28 so that higher 
numbers would equal more comity. A revised 0 to 24 scale is 
the result. Now, higher scores indicate, respectively, a stron-
ger commitment to comity and high assertiveness; low 
scores, toleration or encouragement of uncivil behavior and 
passivity. Average scores were 13.93 for comity and 4.6 for 
assertiveness. Comity scores ranged from 2.0 for Gingrich to 
21.5 for Nicholas Longworth (R-OH, 1925-1931). 
Assertiveness ranged from a low of 1.0 for William 
Pennington (R-NJ, 1860-1861) to highs of 7.0 for James G. 
Blaine (R-ME, 1869-1875) and Thomas B. Reed (R-ME, 
1889-1891 and 1895-1899).
One might expect that an assertive speaker with a strong 
commitment to comity would be most effective in leading the 
House, or at minimum, be held in high regard by House col-
leagues. Conversely, one who was neither committed to 
comity nor assertive might be less effective and held in less 
regard. Qualitative evidence from numerous historical 
sources suggests that the well-regarded Henry Clay falls into 
the first category (Colton, 1846/2004; Follett, 1896; Remini, 
1991; Schurz, 1893). However, Thomas Reed—not known 
for his strong commitment to comity and denied the usual 
courtesy of a unanimous vote of thanks, but highly asser-
tive—has also been judged to be very effective (Brown, 1922; 
Fuller, 1909; Robinson, 1930; W. H. Smith, 1928). Comparing 
the two speakers, Alexander (1916/1970) observes,
What Clay did as Speaker in the first half of the [nineteenth] 
century; Thomas B. Reed did it for the last half. He had the courage 
to suggest parliamentary remedies and the personal force to apply 
and establish them. Men [sic] recognized him as a pre-eminently 
able leader . . . and while he lacked the tact and perhaps the wisdom 
of Clay, evidenced by the disclosure of prejudices and provincial 
narrowness, he left the Chair a legacy of power . . . (p. 284)
It is not clear, then, which combination of comity and 
assertiveness scores would be most and least efficacious. 
Further research will be necessary to provide answers, with 
interesting implications for policy outputs.
Figure 1 arrays the 50 Speakers’ scores in two-dimen-
sional space divided into quadrants separated by the respec-
tive means of comity and assertiveness. A higher proportion 
of speakers display above-average rather than below-average 
commitments to comity and just more than a majority dem-
onstrate above-average assertiveness. The most populated 
quadrants are the bottom right (high comity and low asser-
tiveness) with 16 speakers, including Schuyler Colfax (R-IN, 
1863-1869), Sam Rayburn (D-TX, 1940-1947, 1949-1953, 
1955-1961), and Carl Albert (D-OK, 1971-1977). In the top 
left quadrant (high assertiveness and low comity), we also 
find 16 speakers (including Reed, Cannon, and Gingrich). 
Just 12 speakers (including Clay, Banks, and Longworth) 
display the supposed happy combination of high assertive-
ness with high comity scores, whereas the presumably unde-
sirable bottom left quadrant (low comity, low assertiveness) 
is occupied by just six speakers, almost all of whom few will 
recognize.
Exploring Speakers’ Comity and 
Assertiveness: Personal Background 
and Context
We now move to our hypothesized conceptualization of lead-
ership style as conditional on the context plus the leader’s per-
sonal characteristics by testing models that draw on legislative 
socialization and experiential learning theory (Kolb, 1983). A 
wealth of political socialization literature shows how individu-
als learn and internalize certain values and norms very early in 
their lives, whereas the congressional literature shows how 
most members are assimilated into congressional norms, cus-
toms, practices, and procedures, thereby contributing to insti-
tutional loyalty and patriotism and helping moderate aberrant 
behavior (Asher, 1973; Bell & Price, 1975; Bullock, 1976; 
Clapp, 1963; Davidson, 1990, p. 52; Loomis, 1988; Rosenthal, 
1998; Sigel, 1965; Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, & Ferguson, 
1962). A third body of literature shows how an individual’s 
ability to step on to a political leadership trajectory is deter-
mined by the host society’s social and political opportunity 
structure, the individual’s social origins, and the self-selection 
tendencies of certain personality types (Prewitt, 1965; Prewitt 
& Eulau, 1971). To evaluate our context-plus-personal charac-
teristics interpretation of congressional leadership, we use 
Table 2. Bivariate Correlations Between the Authors’ “Best” 









Mean-spirited—Generous .51** .66** .79**
Courteous—Discourteous .60** .78** .66**
Agreeable—Disagreeable .69** .67** .70**
Fair—Unfair .67** .60** .47**
Summative comity score 
(first four items)
.79** .81** .83**
Assertive—Unassertive .64** .52** .66**
n = 50
**p < .01. (two-tailed).
by guest on April 23, 2016Downloaded from 
Owens et al. 5
multiple regression analysis to estimate the extent to which 
individual speakers’ differentiated commitments to House 
comity and personal assertiveness are related to their pre-leg-
islative careers, prior legislative experience, personal charac-
teristics, party affiliation, and geographical location, as well as 
to several contextual variables, notably the prevailing partisan 
context in the chamber during their tenure as speaker.
Dependent Variables
We report the results of four different models, two estimating 
a speaker’s commitment to comity and two their personal 
assertiveness. In the first of each pair of equations, the 
speaker is the unit of analysis, with a sample size of 50, and 
in the second model, the unit of analysis is each Congress. 
By using two different configurations of our data, we can 
better manage possible biases arising from the different 
lengths of service of our speakers.11 This strategy will also 
provide more robust tests of the theoretical underpinnings of 
our regression estimates. The speaker-based data set likely 
serves to accentuate the relevance of personal background 
characteristics whereas using Congresses as the unit of anal-
ysis will likely advantage the significance of contextual 
considerations.
In each of the models, our dependent variable is a propor-
tional measure of either comity or assertiveness scores (i.e., 
Figure 1. House speakers’ commitment to comity and assertiveness, 1789-2006.
Note. Speakers’ commitment to comity and assertiveness are negatively correlated (r = −.44; p < .01, two-tailed).
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the authors’ “best” commitment to comity and assertiveness 
scores for each speaker were divided by the maximum value 
for each scale). Thus, Speaker Longworth received a propor-
tional commitment to comity score of .875 (his raw score of 
21.0 divided by the scale’s maximum value of 24), whereas 
Speaker Gingrich received a score of .083 (2 divided by 
24).12 Given the proportional nature of the dependent vari-
able, beta regression is used instead of ordinary least squares 
to estimate the models. When each Congress is the unit of 
analysis, the stationarity of the dependent variable is checked 
using the augmented Dicky–Fuller test. In both the commit-
ment to comity and assertiveness models, the dependent 
variables are stationary. The residuals of these models were 
also checked using the Durbin–Watson test, and there is no 
significant auto-correlation found.
To contend with the different limitations of our data sets, 
within the confines of our research design, some compro-
mise was necessary. To accommodate a speaker presiding in 
multiple Congresses within the speaker data set, we used the 
mean measure of partisan context across the entire period he 
occupied the speaker’s chair. Using mean values is problem-
atic, particularly for Muhlenberg, Clay, John Taylor 
(Democrat-Republican-NY), Reed, Sam Rayburn (D-TX), 
and Joseph Martin (R-MA), whose tenure as speaker was not 
continuous. We avoid this problem when we run the analysis 
with each Congress as the unit of analysis. The Congress 
data set allows the partisan context and certain personal 
characteristics, such as Relative Age and Years in Congress, 
to vary across a speaker’s time in office. However, in the 
Congress as the unit of analysis data set, we confront a differ-
ent problem. In eight different instances, more than one indi-
vidual served as speaker in a single Congress. We handle this 
by creating an additional observation for those Congresses 
(one for each speaker who served), which has the effect of 
increasing the sample size to 117, although the actual num-
ber of Congresses used is 109.
Speakers’ Personal Characteristics
Davidson (1990) has noted that although members of the 
Congress are more alike than different, thereby posing ana-
lytical problems when trying to isolate the effects of different 
backgrounds on members’ behavior, that difficulty “should 
not blind us to the subtle power of background characteris-
tics” (p. 52). Studies have demonstrated how professional 
education and socialization affect how individuals compre-
hend the world around them (Larson, 1977). Specifically, 
Geison (1983) argues that professions and professionals 
assume a “professional ideology and rhetoric” that shapes 
the way individuals understand their world. Moore and 
Rosenblum (1970) observe that professional socialization 
involves discernible changes in the individual so that he or 
she becomes part of an exclusive professional group, whereas 
Shanfield and Benjamin (1985) find that “professional 
schools . . . exert intense control by purposely influencing 
beliefs, values and personality characteristics of students; 
and law schools appear to be the most invasive among all 
graduate education” (p. 65).
These contentions lead to our first hypothesis concerning 
background characteristics. The high incidence of lawyer-
legislators in the Congress is well known and has led to the 
suggestion that their behavior differs from that of non-lawyer 
peers (Morgan, 1966; Schlesinger, 1957). “Men who have 
made a special study of the laws,” observed de Tocqueville 
(1956) of early 19th-century American legislators, “derive 
from this occupation certain habits of order, a taste for for-
malities, and a kind of instinctive regard for the regular con-
nection of ideas” (p. 123). More recently, Miller (1995) has 
suggested, “Because of their legal training and professional 
socialization, lawyer-politicians seem much more concerned 
about following proper procedures” (p. 174), and, in a subse-
quent study, that state senators who were lawyers were more 
inclined to view themselves as trustees of the public good 
with high respect for the law and legal processes (Miller, 
1993, 1995).
Extrapolating, we hypothesize that speakers who are 
Lawyers—in the sense defined by Miller—that is, lawyers 
with legal training who have actually practiced law for 5 or 
more years—are more likely to have been instilled with 
social norms that minimize any proclivity to act on emo-
tional urges in response to popular or partisan demands and 
are therefore more inclined to adhere to comity norms 
(Miller, 1995). We also expect these individuals to be more 
confident and by extension more assertive speakers than 
their non-lawyer colleagues. A number of studies suggest 
that lawyers tend to be achievement-oriented, more aggres-
sive, and more competitive than other professionals and indi-
viduals in general, and even more so the more time they 
spend in court (Chusmir, 1984; Houston, Farese, & La Du, 
1992). We code speakers with more than 5 years of experi-
ence practicing law are coded “1” and anticipate a positive 
association both with a commitment to comity and 
assertiveness.
Our second independent variable taps a speaker’s prior 
experience in state legislative politics. We expect a speaker 
with greater state legislative experience to be more familiar 
with the principles of lawmaking and more accepting of the 
practice and decorum of congressional governance, includ-
ing responsibility for enacting legislation through reciprocity 
arrangements, compromise, logrolling, coalition building, 
and so forth (Fenno, 1997; Mason, 1938). Research reported 
by Berkman (1993) shows that when state legislators enter 
the U.S. House with considerable legislative experience and 
prowess, they are better able to adapt quickly and well to 
chamber life, and are “better prepared in the personal aspects 
of legislative politics” (p. 77). One House member’s com-
ment quoted by Berkman goes directly to comity: “[former 
state legislators] learn that when you insult somebody you 
are going to regret it later on.” Another observed, “People 
who have not served do not know how to compromise.”
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We code former State Legislators with more than 2 years 
of experience “1,” and expect positive relationships with our 
dependent variables. That is, we hold these speakers will 
have a stronger commitment to comity score and to be more 
comfortable in their U.S. House role and by extension more 
assertive. We opt for a plus 2-year cut point, on the assump-
tion that an individual likely served more than a single term 
and was therefore a member of the state legislature long 
enough to imbibe at least some of the norms of the legislative 
process.13
For similar reasons, we expect a House speaker’s Years in 
Congress to boost both his comity and assertiveness scores. 
We reason that longer congressional experience induces 
greater tolerance and indulgence of colleagues, whereas 
inexperienced or recently elected speakers are more likely to 
adopt a pace-setting leadership style less regarding of comity. 
Hibbing (1999) observes how House members acquire 
greater civility and a greater willingness to compromise over 
time. Clapp (1963) writes, “If their views regarding their col-
leagues have changed since they entered the House, the 
change has been in the direction of greater appreciation of 
their abilities” (p. 18; see also Loomis 1984, pp. 195-196). 
By the same logic, we suggest more congressional experi-
ence will induce greater confidence in leading the chamber 
and higher assertiveness scores. Ergo, we anticipate that the 
earliest speakers—who by definition had little or no experi-
ence in the House and, therefore, would not have reached 
that threshold of parliamentary expertise and comfort that 
ceteris paribus would give them confidence to be more asser-
tive in the chair—will be associated with lower assertiveness 
scores. Our measure of congressional experience is simply 
the number of years served in Congress prior to a speaker’s 
election to the chair.14 Again, we expect both our comity and 
assertiveness scores to be associated positively with years of 
congressional experience.
Third, age stratification theory holds individuals in differ-
ent age groups tend to share levels of physical energy and 
mental capacity, ability, and motivations related to their age 
(Riley, Johnson, & Foner, 1972). This hypothesized effect is 
conceptually, if not empirically, distinct from the effects 
caused by longer prior socialization and learning within the 
chamber itself. Accordingly, we hypothesize that Relative 
Age will be associated with more comity but less assertive-
ness in the chair. As Rager (1998) notes, “Uncle Joe” Cannon 
was 67 when he became speaker, and almost 74 by the time 
of the 1910 Revolt, by which time he “began to realize that 
he was no longer ‘good old Uncle Joe’ to all his colleagues in 
the House . . . But he did not fully come to grips with the 
reason for it” (p. 73). Younger liberal Democrats reached 
similar conclusions about the elderly John McCormack 
(D-MA) in the late 1960s (see Bolling, 1974).15
We use Relative Age in each of our models, which we 
calculated as a speaker’s age in years (including fractions of 
years) divided by the mean age of all House members at the 
time they began their service as chair of the chamber—thus 
giving Cannon a relative age value of 1.36 and R. M. T. 
Hunter (Whig-VA), the youngest member to assume the 
speaker’s chair at the age of 30 in the 26th Congress (1839-
1841), a value of 0.71.16 Again, we anticipate a positive asso-
ciation with comity and a negative association with 
assertiveness.
Our fifth and sixth personal characteristics variables tap 
speakers’ political–cultural backgrounds associated with the 
different parties and geographic regions. Writing at the turn 
of the 20th century, James Bryce (1910) observed that
among the Federalists, and their successors the Whigs, and the 
more recent Republicans, there has never been wanting a full 
faith in the power of freedom . . . Neither [the Republicans] nor 
any American party has ever professed itself the champion of 
authority and order . . . Nevertheless, it is rather towards . . . the 
Federalist-Whig-Republican Party than towards the Democrats 
that those who have valued the principle of authority have been 
generally drawn. (p. 18)
Even more directly, Brown (1922) insists that the power 
of the speakership that led to the 1910 revolt against Speaker 
Cannon “had been developed almost entirely by the Whig 
and Republican parties” (pp. 169-170). Similar cultural com-
parisons between the contemporary parties have been drawn 
(Freeman, 1986). In very general terms, the Republican Party 
is noted for a more top-down, hierarchical power structure, is 
found to be more homogeneous on average, and to display 
less tolerance toward political differences and the give and 
take of legislative life. Democrats, in contrast, comprise a 
more heterogeneous coalition, develop more decentralized 
organizational structures, and are more likely to be accepting 
of the values associated with legislative life (Fiorina, 1994; 
Loomis, 1988). We code speakers representing the Federalist, 
Whig, and the modern/post–Civil War Republican Party as 
members of a Pro-Authority Party with a value of “1,” and 
we hypothesize that in presiding over and leading the House, 
these individuals will demonstrate lower levels of comity 
and greater assertiveness.17
Our sixth personal characteristic variable taps the unique 
regional political culture and style of the South. From one 
perspective, the South is seen as purveying an aristocratic 
political culture that represents the epitome of gentility, cour-
tesy, kindliness, and ease, and was embodied in heroes such 
as George Washington, James Madison, and Thomas 
Jefferson. Many analysts, however, have rejected what W. J. 
Cash called this “gone-with-the-windery,” instead emphasiz-
ing within the region’s historical political culture the mani-
festations of popular religion, the ill-mannered nature and 
inhumanity of much of Southern politics, and the relation-
ship between violence and honor in early Southern culture, 
where honor was inextricably connected with physical cour-
age and tenacity, and often with violence (Cash, 1941, pp. 
20-21). It was believed that a man who would not defend his 
liberty and honor had neither (Cash, 1941; Nisbet & Cohen, 
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1996; Wyatt-Brown, 1986). We entered Southerners as a 
dummy variable with a value of “1” for speakers who repre-
sented any of the 11 states of the former Confederacy. We 
hypothesize that these individuals will demonstrate, on aver-
age, lower commitments to comity and greater 
assertiveness.
Finally, we enter relative Ideological Extremism scores 
for each speaker in our models, as evinced in their roll call 
voting before assuming the speaker’s chair. We hold although 
a speaker’s commitment to comity (or civility) is conceptu-
ally and empirically distinct from his or her partisanship and/
or ideological extremism, it is of course possible that the lat-
ter might influence the former. To provide a robust test for 
the influence of a speaker’s personal background experi-
ences and individual characteristics, we control for his own 
contribution to partisan and ideological polarization. Because 
the speaker most often does not vote while in office, we fol-
low King & Zeckhauser (2002) and measure ideological 
extremeness of a speaker by the proportion of the majority 
party that has a DW-NOMINATE score more moderate/less 
extreme than his DW-NOMINATE score in the Congress 
preceding his election to the chair.18 We expect a speaker’s 
ideological extremism to be inversely associated with his 
commitment to comity and positively associated with his 
assertiveness.
Contextual Partisan/Institutional Factors
The three remaining independent variables tap the partisan 
and ideological contexts in which successive speakers pre-
sided over and led the House. As we noted earlier, many 
scholars argue that the strength of leadership exercised by a 
speaker is primarily a function of the majority party’s inter-
nal homogeneity and the degree of polarization between the 
majority and minority parties (Aldrich & Rohde, 2000; 
Binder, 1996; Binder, 1997; Cooper & Brady, 1981; Rohde, 
1991; Rohde & Shepsle, 1995; but see Schickler, 2001). 
According to the conditional party government thesis, when 
majority party preference homogeneity is high and the two 
parties are ideologically distinct, the majority party will del-
egate and centralize greater power in its leader; where these 
conditions do not obtain, leaders will be less assertive. 
Similarly, scholars have demonstrated a close correspon-
dence between strong speakers and high inter-party ideologi-
cal polarization (S. S. Smith & Gamm, 2001).
In her efforts to explain the introduction of new rules and 
procedures to advantage the majority party—and, by defini-
tion, strengthen the majority party leadership’s hand—Binder 
concurs with the conditional party government thesis but 
opts for a concept of majority party capacity, which is deter-
mined by the relative cohesiveness and size of the majority 
party. We use a similar logic and opt specifically for 
Schickler’s (2001) Ideological Capacity concept as our first 
contextual consideration. The measure is intended to capture 
the changing partisan–ideological context in which the 
speaker presided over the House. Using this measure allows 
us to separate two distinct political components of House 
polarization, and thus the context in which successive speak-
ers operated; viz, majority size and majority partisan cohe-
sion (see also Dion, 1997; S. S. Smith & Gamm, 2001). For 
the Congress data set, we calculated Ideological Capacity as 
the absolute value of the difference between the first largest 
party’s median DW-NOMINATE score and the floor median 
and the absolute value of the difference between the second 
largest party’s median DW-NOMINATE score and the floor 
median. For the speaker data set, we were obliged to use the 
mean of all values from each Congress in which the speaker 
occupied the chair. For both data sets, we assume that the 
majority party held more sway in those Congresses for which 
“ideological capacity” was high; and we anticipate that a 
speaker will be more assertive and his commitment to comity 
will be weaker.19
Because Schickler’s measure of ideological capacity does 
not directly tap the relative size of the speaker’s party, we 
also enter Majority Size into our equations, although entering 
this variable yields somewhat mixed theoretical expecta-
tions. Contemplating the results of the 1908 House elections 
and anticipating a victory in the presidential election, future 
President William Howard Taft wrote to President Theodore 
Roosevelt expressing a wish for a small Republican majority 
of “eight or ten votes,” so as to limit Speaker Cannon’s power 
(Gwinn, 1957, p. 155). Twenty-six years later, newly elected 
Speaker Joseph Byrns (D-TN) echoed Taft’s concern follow-
ing the huge Democratic victories in the 1934 House elec-
tions, apparently viewing a smaller majority as more 
amenable to party discipline, and majority leadership influ-
ence (Irish, 2001). Dion (1997) goes further than Byrns: 
smaller majority parties are not only more cohesive but also 
seek to ensure their rule by reducing the minority party’s 
rights to obstruct (pp. 31-37). Corroborating this finding, 
Smith and Gamm (2001) cite the assertive Reed’s aggressive 
actions in the 51st Congress (1889-1891) in which 
Republicans held only an eight-seat majority, to enact new 
rules that significantly strengthened the majority party’s 
hand and reduced the rights of the minority to obstruct. 
Speaker Hastert’s highly assertive “take no prisoners strat-
egy” during the 107th House (2001-2002), when Republicans 
had only an eight-seat majority, also supports this proposi-
tion (see Owens, 2004, p. 134). The corollary to this parties-
at-near-parity-equals-assertive leadership/lower comity is 
the contrary proposition: that, given a close party split, a pru-
dent speaker may well adopt a less assertive posture and, 
concomitantly, a greater commitment to comity, in the expec-
tation that such a posture will yield better legislative out-
comes for his party, less opposition from the minority, and 
greater legitimacy for the chair. Thus, Democrats’ slim 
majorities, respectively, in the 72nd (1931-1933) and 78th 
Congress (1943-1945) might explain the cautious leadership 
of John Nance Garner (D-TX) and Rayburn (see Gould & 
Young, 1998).
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In the absence of a strong expectation one way or the 
other, we nonetheless enter Majority Size as an important 
control variable and subject our interpretation of its statisti-
cal significance to a two-tailed test. Operationally, the vari-
able is defined as the proportional size of the speaker’s party 
in the House (speaker’s party size/chamber size) when the 
speaker was first elected to the chair in the Speaker Model. 
This consideration is allowed to vary when each Congress is 
the unit of analysis.20
Our third and final contextual variable focuses on the par-
tisan configuration of the separated system during the tenure 
of each speaker. Split Party Government has been a common 
occurrence in American history, whether in its “pure” or 
“quasi” forms (see Binder, 1997, pp. 74-75). Clearly, chang-
ing patterns of inter-branch relations over time depend to 
some extent on the degree to which the parties are internally 
homogeneous, as well as on inter-personal differences 
between presidents and congressional leaders.21 Still, parti-
san and institutional conflict between the different branches 
of government will be reinforced by the configuration of 
election outcomes, specifically, whether they produce uni-
fied or split party control of government. Partisan pres-
sures—whether they are in support or in opposition to the 
president—ought to be especially strong in the majoritarian 
House. Congressional histories repeatedly demonstrate the 
pressures placed on House speakers to assert their party’s 
interests and policies vis-à-vis the president (Alexander, 
1916/1970; Follett, 1896; Fuller, 1909).
We contend that when the speaker is from a different party 
than the president, we should expect institutional competi-
tion between the branches to heighten, and within this pro-
cess, we should expect the speaker—as the leader of the 
opposition—to be more assertive from the chair. Thus, when 
Jacksonian Democrats won a majority in the 20th House 
(1829-1830) 2 years after the Whig candidate John Quincy 
Adams was chosen president by the House, the new 
Jacksonian Speaker Andrew Stevenson (VA) boldly 
appointed majorities of Adams’ Administration opponents to 
all House committees and aggressively “used the power of 
his office to implement the Jacksonian party’s program” 
(Kennon, 1985, p. 69). The biographer of the assertive 
Democratic Speaker Samuel Randall notes that he was “at 
his best” when partisan control was split between a 
Democratic House and a Republican president and Senate 
(House, 1935, p. 90). Other scholars have noted the aggres-
siveness of 19th-century speakers Stevenson, Carlisle, Reed, 
and Charles F. Crisp (D-GA) and more recent strong speak-
ers, such as Jim Wright (D-TX) and Gingrich, under condi-
tions of split party control (see Barry, 1989; Fuller, 1909; 
Kennon, 1985; Peters, 1997; Rohde, 1991; Sinclair, 1995). 
We assign a value of 1 to Split Party Government when a 
different party from the president’s controls the House, and 
anticipate under these conditions, ceterus paribus, that 
House speakers will be more assertive and evince a weaker 
commitment to comity.
Results
Tables 3 and 4 provide the results of our analyses.22 Focusing 
on Table 3, which estimates commitment to comity scores, the 
regression results are similar in both the Speaker and Congress 
Models. In both model runs, speakers’ personal characteristics 
shine through as the dominant influence on a commitment to 
comity. Indeed, these effects are so strong they eliminate those 
from the contextual variables, none of which is significant in 
either model at the 90% confidence level. Having prior experi-
ence as a lawyer and as a state legislator, being from the South, 
and being a member of a pro-authority party (Federalist, Whig, 
or Republican) are statistically linked to the variance in speak-
ers’ comity scores in both models, whereas the test of the 
speaker’s ideological extremism vis-à-vis his party is signed as 
expected in both models. However, years in Congress and the 
relative age of the speaker returned mixed results. Based on 
this analysis, one must wholeheartedly accept the null hypoth-
esis that these considerations are not associated with a com-
mitment to comity.
Turning to Table 4, the results support a context-plus-per-
sonal characteristics interpretation of speakers’ personal asser-
tiveness. That is, a speaker’s degree of personal assertiveness 
while presiding and leading from the chair is best explained by 
a combination of contextual and personal characteristics. In 
particular, Schickler’s ideological capacity measure exerts a 
strong influence in both assertiveness models. As we antici-
pated, speakers were more assertive when the ideological bal-
ance of power on the House floor shifted toward the median 
position of the majority party. Split party government is also 
marginally significant and positively associated with a speak-
er’s personal assertiveness in the By Congress Model (p < .08).
However, as in Table 3, speakers’ personal characteristics 
also have an effect on assertiveness while in the chair, 
although the combinations of these factors and the overall 
competence of the models vary some. As Table 4 shows, the 
test of lawyer and state legislator return somewhat mixed 
findings (both were easily significant in the comity models). 
Contrary to the expectations extrapolated from Houston 
et al. (1992), the signs for lawyer in both models are in the 
wrong direction–although at the same time somewhat con-
sistent with Chusmir (1984). He contends that lawyers, with 
the exception of criminal lawyers and judges, are not overtly 
interested in power. Having been a practicing lawyer engen-
ders a commitment to comity but is inversely related to a 
speaker being personally assertive from the chair. Having 
been a state legislator was positively related to a commitment 
to comity and in the “By Congress” analysis linked to asser-
tiveness. Results for both the Speaker and Congress Models 
also confirm that those speakers who assumed the chair at an 
older age relative to the House—such as Pennington and 
McCormack—tended to be less personally assertive. Relative 
youth entails greater assertiveness, the classic example being 
Henry Clay, elected speaker on his first appearance in the 
House. Last, in both models, we find that being a member of 
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a pro-authority party and length of service before ascending 
to the chair are positively associated with a speaker’s per-
sonal assertiveness, albeit years in Congress is only signifi-
cant at a lower confidence level in the model that uses each 
speaker as the unit of analysis.23
Taken together, all four models perform reasonably well. 
Given the large time span covered by our data and the gen-
eral purpose of this research, these results are encouraging. 
Two different data sets, one a cross-sectional analysis and the 
other a time-series analysis, both demonstrate the importance 
of personal characteristics in determining speakers’ behavior 
in the chair. Even so, our purpose was to present an empirical 
case for a context-plus-personal characteristics model of 
speakership leadership style. Our regression results provide 
validation of this model for speakers’ assertiveness, but not 
for the variance in these leaders’ commitments to chamber 
comity. No context variable was statistically significant in 
either of the comity models.
Conclusion
The systematic longitudinal analysis of leadership style has 
been understudied, partly because of the difficulty in quanti-
fying “style.” We began this research with the propositions 
that both commitment to comity and assertiveness are mean-
ingful components of a speaker’s leadership style and that 
these elements of speaker’s behavior are influenced by vari-
ous personal characteristics reflecting personality, prior 
socialization, and experiential learning processes, as well as 
the specific institutional and partisan contexts in which they 
seek to exercise leadership. The scores obtained from our 
exhaustive coding process resonate well with received wis-
dom on the reputations of House speakers. The results from 
our regression models, which include both personal charac-
teristics and contextual variables, also comport reasonably 
well with our interactive interpretation of speakers’ leader-
ship styles. Context is important to understanding speaker-
ship behavior, but so is a speaker’s personal background, 
prior experience, and other individual characteristics; exclu-
sively so, with regard to a speaker’s commitment to chamber 
comity.
In consequence, we now have evidence that House speak-
ers acquire their distinct leadership styles through a variety 
of iterative developmental processes beginning with prior 
professional socialization before entering politics and, then, 
subsequently strengthened as members of state legislatures. 
Once they become speakers, their personal assertiveness—
derived from their state legislative experience, relative age, 
party affiliation, and ideological proclivities—interacts with 




By speaker By Congress
Variables Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE)
Personal characteristics
 Lawyer + 0.87 (0.23)*** 0.70 (0.16)***
 State legislator + 0.62 (0.24)** 0.41 (0.16)**
 Years in 
congressa
+ −0.01 (0.02) 0.002 (0.01)
 Relative agea + 0.49 (0.71) −0.03 (0.60)
 Pro-authority 
party
− −0.51 (0.26)* −0.42 (0.18)**
 Southerner − −0.54 (0.26)* −0.41 (0.18)*
 Ideological 
extremism




− −0.16 (0.60) −0.46 (0.40)
 Majority size +, − 0.63 (1.46) 0.87 (0.87)
 Split party 
government
− 0.31 (0.40) 0.04 (0.18)




aYears in Congress and Relative Age take on Congress-specific values in 
the “BY CONGRESS” model.
bContext variables are averaged over a speaker’s entire tenure in the 
chair in the BY SPEAKER model.
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 (one-tailed, except for Majority 
Size).




By speaker By Congress
Variables Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE)
Personal characteristics
 Lawyer + −0.40 (0.26)† −0.28 (0.18)†
 State legislator + 0.34 (0.27) 0.35 (0.19)*
 Years in 
congressa
+ 0.03 (0.02)† 0.02 (0.01)*
 Relative agea − −2.15 (0.82)** −1.99 (0.69)**
 Pro-authority 
party
+ 0.51 (0.29)* 0.51 (0.21)**
 Southerner + −0.002 (0.29) −0.07 (0.20)
 Ideological 
extremism




+ 1.87 (0.69)** 2.08 (0.46)***
 Majority size +, − 0.18 (1.68) 0.41 (0.98)
 Split party 
government
+ 0.45 (0.47) 0.30 (0.21)†




aYears in Congress and Relative Age take on Congress-specific values in 
the “BY CONGRESS” model.
bContext variables are averaged over a speaker’s entire tenure in the 
chair in the BY SPEAKER model.
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 (one-tailed, except for Majority Size).
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and is constrained by the partisan/institutional context in 
which they preside and seek to provide leadership.24
The underlying premise of this research has been that 
context alone is likely an insufficient explanation of leader-
ship style, as it relates to either a commitment to comity or 
assertiveness. Both the systematic analysis presented here 
and numerous historical accounts and biographies of House 
speakers attest to the importance of personality both in the 
initial selection of a party nominee for the speaker’s chair 
and in his or her performance as presiding officer and party 
leader. These findings not only have implications for con-
temporary debate on congressional comity and leader recruit-
ment but also future research on the House. Conceivably, the 
comity and assertiveness scores developed by this research 
might be useful as independent variables within extant mod-
els of House behavior, including legislative productivity, 
House–Senate relations, and so forth, over time and in light 
of the exogenous behavior of the speaker as leader.
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Notes
 1. Indeed, most contextual scholars do not absolutely exclude 
the influence of leaders’ personal characteristics. So, although 
Cooper and Brady (1981) argue that “Skill cannot fully com-
pensate for deficiencies in the quality or quantity of induce-
ments,” they also observe that in the context of decentralized 
committee government in the mid-decades of the 20th century, 
“the personal, political skills of the leadership [Rayburn], 
rather than its sources of institutional power, [was] the criti-
cal determinant of the fate of party programs” (pp. 420, 423). 
Rohde (1991) also acknowledges that leaders’ different styles 
matter, but he insists that “they will remain important [only] as 
long as the underlying forces that created this partisan resur-
gence persist . . . ‘[t] he strategies and tactics of leaders are 
shaped in large measure by the preferences and attitudes of the 
members they represent’” (pp. 172, 192, 272). Using principal-
agent theory, Sinclair (1995) similarly explains Speaker Jim 
Wright’s early leadership style in terms of responding to “[s]
pecial political conditions” and “[t]he members expectations,” 
although beyond the confines of her theory, she too concedes 
a minor role for stylistic differences between different leaders 
(p. 272).
 2. In what amounts to a third approach to understanding House 
leadership, Green (2010) uses goal theory to posit a much 
wider range of speakers’ goals, including helping his or her 
party, winning re-election, passage of desired legislation, sup-
porting the president, and defending the House’s prerogatives 
within a highly complex typology, and a complex model that 
seeks to explain leadership behavior. He argues that the goals 
that speakers opt to pursue explain their choice of leadership 
strategies and tactics on the House floor, apparently regardless 
of context or personal style.
 3. See, for example, Mary Parker Follett (1896) and Peters (1997) 
on Clay, and Robinson (1930) and Alexander (1916/1970) on 
Reed. Comment on recent speakers has followed a similar vein 
(Green, 2010; Palazzolo, 1992; Peters, 1997; Polsby, 2004; 
Strahan & Palazzolo, 2004).
 4. For a discussion of the shortcoming of these measurement 
strategies, see Charles Stewart (1999), but also Jenkins and 
Stewart III (2002) and Strahan, Gunning, and Vining (2006).
 5. Several short-term occupants of the speaker’s chair were omit-
ted from our data set, including Theodore Pomeroy (R-NY) 
who served for only 1 day in 1869, George Dent (F-MD) who 
served as speaker pro tempore during Speaker Dayton’s illness 
in the fifth House, and Samuel Cox (D-NY) and Milton Saylor 
(D-OH), both of whom served as speaker pro tempore follow-
ing the death of Speaker Kerr (D-IN) in the 44th House.
 6. The biographic file with complete bibliographic reference is 
available from the authors.
 7. Some of these elements comport with the “big five” dimen-
sions in personality research (see Winter, 2005).
 8. The authors were also conscious of the possibility—even the 
certainty of political bias in newspaper accounts when biog-
raphers made extensive use of newspapers. Necessarily, judg-
ment was applied to the interpretations of these accounts.
 9. Encouragingly, the first-cut coding found the two authors had 
placed speakers on the same side of the median scale value on 
all five scales 40 out of 50 times.
10. The authors’ second-cut coding correlates are r = .90 on the 
generosity scale, .85 on courtesy, .90 on agreeableness, .87 on 
fairness, and .89 on the assertiveness scale. All correlations are 
statistically significant at p < .001.
11. Speakers Langdon Cheves (Jeffersonian Democrat-SC) and 
John Bell (Whig-TN), for example, held the chair for less than 
2 years, whereas Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-TX) presided in 11 
Congresses over an interrupted period of time.
12. Values were not rounded in the empirical testing.
13. Twenty-four of the 50 House speakers had more than 2 years’ 
experience in a state legislature, 15 served 2 years or less, and 
the remaining 11 had no state legislative experience.
14. In our data sets, we calculate congressional service from the 
date the member was first sworn in. The values include frac-
tions of years. Muhlenberg in the first Congress (but not the 
third Congress) had no previous congressional experience, 
whereas McCormack became speaker with the longest prior 
congressional service, over 33 years.
15. See also Evans and Novak (1969).
16. McCormack and Henry Rainey (D-IL, 1933-1934), elected to 
the office at 70 and 72, respectively, were the oldest to become 
speaker. Clay became Speaker at 34, and Bell and Grow at 37.
17. Speakers’ party affiliations are derived from Kenneth C. 
Martis (1989).
18. Thus, if a Republican speaker had a DW-NOMINATE score 
of .50, his ideological extremism score was the percentage of 
Republicans in the relevant Congress that had a DW-NOMINATE 
score less than .50. If the speaker was Democrat and had a 
DW-NOMINATE score of −.50, then, his score is the percent-
age of Democrats that had a DW-NOMINATE score greater than 
.50. For example, for the 50th House, Speaker Reed receives a 
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value on this variable equal to .97, indicating that 97% of the 
Republican majority was more moderate/less extreme than 
Reed prior to his election as speaker. Comparatively, Speaker 
Gingrich’s score is .58, indicating that 58% of House Republicans 
in the 103rd House were more moderate than he. A speaker’s 
DW-NOMINATE score from the Congress preceding his hold-
ing the chair is used as the measure of his Ideological Extremism, 
but for Muhlenberg, we use his DW-NOMINATE score from 
the third Congress. For Clay and Pennington, who became 
speaker almost immediately on being elected to the House, 
we use, respectively, Clay’s score from the 16th Congress and 
Pennington’s score from the 36th Congress. DW-NOMINATE 
data were obtained from http://www.voteview.com/DWNL.htm.
19. It is possible for this measure to take on a negative value sug-
gesting that the second largest party’s median score is actually 
closer to the chamber median than the first largest party.
20. In certain Congresses (e.g., the third, fourth, 27th, 31st, and 
34th), the speaker’s party did not have a majority of House 
members when he assumed the chair.
21. Not all periods in U.S. history are characterized by partisan 
division—notably, between the 14th and 19th Congresses 
(1815-1825), from the collapse of the Federalist Party to the 
so-called “era of good feelings,” and during the 32nd and 33rd 
Congresses (1851-1855) when, as a consequence of the devas-
tation of the Whig Party over slavery, the United States effec-
tively had one-party government.
22. In reporting results, we purposely forego interpretation of coeffi-
cients of the “one unit change in x is associated with a z increase in 
y” variety for the simple reason that our Comity and Assertiveness 
scales, although rigorously vetted, are not particularly amenable 
to a precise reading of coefficient values. Hence, we discuss our 
results in the more general terms of statistical significance.
23. We also ran, but have not reported here, a number of other 
models using other contextual variables, including measures 
of majority party preference homogeneity and majority party 
capacity that do not perform any better in the equations pre-
sented in Tables 3 and 4. Similarly, when we break the by-Con-
gress analysis into two periods, pre- and post-Speaker Reed, 
the contextual variables are not improved in either the comity 
or assertiveness models.
24. For an earlier exploration of an experiential learning/cognitive 
framework approach to understanding speakers, see Swift (1998).
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